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Social Welfare Reform: An Analysis of Germany's
Agenda 2010 Labor Market Reforms and the United
States' Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996
By Jennifer Allison*
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment presents a historical view of the social welfare
systems in the United States and Germany. It then explains and
analyzes recent large-scale reforms made to each country's social
welfare system-the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 in the United States, which
profoundly impacted the availability of welfare benefits to poor
Americans, and Germany's Agenda 2010 campaign, which reformed
Germany's system of providing benefits to the long-term
unemployed.
Although this comment offers a rather clinical analysis of each of
these reform movements, one important fact should not remain
overlooked---each set of reforms had a profound impact on a large
number of each country's most vulnerable citizens. People who
heavily relied on government benefits were forced to make
significant adjustments after these reforms were implemented,
compounding whatever problems they had before that made it
difficult to get and maintain a steady source of income.
* J.D. candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, 2007. All Web links
in this article are valid as of August 28, 2006. Except where indicated, German-to-
English translations are my own and I assume full responsibility for any errors they
contain. I am grateful for the guidance of Professor Gregory Ogden of Pepperdine
Law School and Prof. Dr. Volker Behr of the Juristische Fakultdit at the University
of Augsburg in Germany. Special thanks to my husband Ali, without whose
support my dream of attending law school would never have become a reality.
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The politicians who enacted reforms in the United States and
Germany had economic and political reasons for doing so, and the
validity of those reasons should not be underestimated.' However,
social welfare is not just a system of laws-it is a final lifeline for the
most needy members of society. If lawmakers are not mindful of the
real needs of people served by social welfare, then any reforms they
make to the social welfare system can do no more than serve a
narrow political or economic agenda, and will only end up hurting
those the system aims to help.
Government establishment and maintenance of a social welfare
system is not a new concept. This idea was extensively contemplated
by the humanist scholars of the 16th century, including Spaniard Juan
Luis Vives.2 These Humanists helped to develop the notion that the
government, for its own sake as well as for the sake of those it serves,
must take care of its poor and do whatever possible to eliminate
poverty. Vives wrote, "[t]remendous honor adheres in the state in
which no beggar is seen" and "[g]reater peace will prevail where
everyone is provided for." 3
Vives recognized that that the government must change and adapt
its social welfare system: "[iun a state, anything ravaged or ruined by
time or fortune is renewed, such as walls, ditches, ramparts, streams,
institutions, customs, laws themselves; so it would be equally
reasonable to reform that method of poor relief which in various
ways in the passage of time has become outmoded."4
Throughout its history, Germany has provided generous benefits
to its indigent, disabled, and unemployed populations through a
federally-mandated social welfare system. However, over the last
1 Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of Social Welfare in the
Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303 (1999).
2. See JUAN LuIs VIVES, ON ASSISTANCE TO THE POOR 3-10 (Alice Tobriner
trans., 1999) (1971). Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) was a Spanish contemporary of
the Humanist scholar Sir Thomas More. Id. at 3, 15. A university professor in
Spain, England, and France over the course of his life, he was active in matters of
educational and welfare reform throughout Europe during the 16th century. See id.
at 5.
3.Jd. at 55.
4. Id. at 37. Interestingly, a critical element of Vives' proposed system of
poor-relief was that poor people should be required to work, and those that cannot
find jobs on their own should be assisted in their job-seeking efforts by the
government. Id. at 5.
two decades, the German economy has taken a sharp downturn.
Accordingly, the German government has been forced to reexamine
its policy of providing such generous social welfare benefits and to
change its system.5
Germany is not the only country that has felt it necessary to
reevaluate its social welfare policy. The United States, faced with
growing discontent over what was seen as a rapidly expanding
population of people who would rather live on welfare than work,
implemented historic changes to the structure of its social welfare
system in 1996.6 These changes were chiefly targeted at single
mothers with children-a segment of the population which,
ironically, had long been considered to be highly deserving of social
welfare assistance.7
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Social Welfare in Germany
The German government's social welfare system began when it
was established by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1889.8
The fact that Bismarck introduced this type of system at all was an
affront to political conservatives in Germany at the time, prompting
many of them to call the conservative chancellor a socialist.9
Bismarck's program featured a mandatory insurance system, paid
into by workers, employers, and the government, which initially
5. See infra Part II-A.
6 United States Social Security Administration, Historical Background and
Development of Social Security - Legislative Changes in 1996 & 1997,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited October 16, 2006).
7. See infra Part 1I-B.
8. UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, BRIEF HISTORY OF
SOCIAL SECURITY--OTTO VON BISMARCK, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ottob.html
[hereinafter USSSA-Bismarck]. At least one of the individual states (Prussia) that
comprised Bismarck's unified Germany included a social welfare provision in its
own general legislation. Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of Social
Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303 (1999).
Specifically, the Prussian Allgemeiene Landrecht (Prussian Comprehensive Law)
of 1794 mandated not only that the state support the poor, but also that employers
provide assistance to their ill employees. Id.
9. USSSA-Bismarck, supra note 8.
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offered benefits only to those who were unable to work to support
themselves because of age or disability.' ° It was later expanded to
include programs for workers' compensation, as well as insurance
programs for those who could not work due to illness and those who
were otherwise unemployed."
The Bismarckian social welfare administration model included
not only the federal unemployment insurance system, but also a
series of local agencies that distributed social welfare benefits to
needy people who did not work or otherwise contribute to the federal
insurance system (a "social net of last resort").12
Bismarck felt that his social welfare program was necessary to
ensure that workers would continue to be productive, allowing the
German economy to continue to thrive. 13 However, history has seen
his true motives questioned. While some scholars view Bismarck's
efforts as a tool to attack his political rivals, 14 others take a more
cynical approach, believing Bismarck used welfare as a way for the
government to control its citizens." Still others, however, believe
10. Id. Welfare advocates around the world, including those in the United
States, paid close attention to how the German government under Bismarck and his
predecessors established their social welfare systems, because they were "the most
highly rationalized, structured... around actuarial calculations, compulsory
participation, and contributions as the objective criterion for granting benefits."
THEOREN SCHLABACH, RATIONALITY & WELFARE: PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF
POVERTY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1875-1935 (1969)
(internal publication of the Social Security Administration only available to the
public online), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/schlabach2.html.
11. USSSA-Bismarck, supra note 8.
12. Helimut Wollmann, Die traditionelle deutsche Selbstverwaltung-ein
Auslaufmodell? [Is Germany's Traditional Type of Local Self-Government Being
Phased Out?], 41 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR KOMMUNALWISSENSCHAFT
[GERMAN JOURNAL FOR URBAN STUDIES] (2002), available at
http://www.difu.de/index.shtml?/publikationen/dfk/en/02_1/02_1_wollmann.shtml.
13. USSSA-Bismarck, supra note 8.
14. The Social Democrats were Bismarck's direct political rivals, and some
view Bismarck's welfare policy as a means to thwart their efforts to gain control of
the government in order to introduce a more extensive welfare system. See Quint,
supra note 8, at 303. See also Deutsche Welle News Service, German Welfare
State at a Turning Point, Deutsche Welle Report on Current Affairs (Aug. 15,
2004), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1297218,00.html.
15. Bismarck's efforts have also been viewed as an effort to "maintain the
social unity by a system of mutual obligation between the State and its citizens"
through "bring[ing] the industrial workers under the control of the State." Antony
the main focus should not be on Bismarck's motives, but on the
system itself as an important means of advancing society as a
whole. 6
During World War I (1914-1918), the German government's
social welfare system expanded greatly due to widespread poverty
and hunger throughout the country. 17 It also had to be adapted to
support not only injured soldiers, but the dependents of soldiers
killed. 8
At the end of World War I, Germany's Social Democrats took
control of the government from Kaiser Wilhelm II. In creating the
Weimar Constitution,' 9 they established a rule of law that was more
favorable to their political ideology than that established by the
former government. Under the Weimar Constitution, the national
government (Reich) reserved for itself the power to create welfare
laws:2 ° "to maintain good health and the ability to work, to protect
motherhood, and to take precautions against the economic
consequences of old age, weakness, and life changes, the national
government will maintain a comprehensive insurance system that
will feature substantive involvement of the insured.",21 This system
Peter Mueller, Bye-Bye Bismarck, DAILY ARTICLE OF THE LUDWIG VON MISES
INSTITUTE (Jul. 24, 2003), http://www.mises.org/story/ 1275.
16. American John Graham Brooks, who spent three years studying the
German welfare system after graduating from Harvard Divinity School in 1875,
expressed doubt that the primary benefit of social welfare was that it provided a
mechanism for controlling the labor force. Schlabach, supra note 10. Instead,
argued Brooks, social welfare is an institution of general social value because it
leads to important and beneficial advances in industrial safety, health care, and
social science scholarship. Id. Brooks believed that it was important for a society
to implement a social welfare system because it is "obviously ethical" for a modem
society to do so. Id. (quoting John Graham Brooks, Compulsory Insurances in
Germany: Including a Appendix Relating to Compulsory Insurance in Other
Countries of Europe, Fourth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor 286,
288 (1895)).
17. DAVID F. CREW, GERMANS ON WELFARE-FROM WEIMAR TO HITLER 5
(1998).
18. Id.
19. Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919.
20. "[Djas Reich [hat] die Gesetzgebung fiber ... die Wohlfartspflege[.]"
("The national government has the power to create welfare laws.") Id. at Art. 9.
21. "Zur Erhaltung der Gesundheit und Arbeitsfdhigkeit, zum Schutz der
Mutterschaft und zur Vorsorge gegen die wirtschafllichen Folgen von Alter
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would allow significantly more of the German population to benefit
than did Bismarck's system, which focused primarily on workers.
However, it turned out to be unsustainable after the Depression (and
widespread unemployment) hit Germany in 1929.22
As Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party came to power in the 1930s,
Germany's social welfare system was revived, but in a strange and
disturbing way. In accordance with the Nazis' ideological beliefs,
indigent people were considered to be "biologically inferior" and
were denied welfare benefits on the basis that they could not
"contribute to the economic and racial health of the nation." 23
By the end of World War II, a defeated Germany had been left
physically and morally shattered, facing the daunting task of
rebuilding. One of the first things the Germans did to rebuild their
country was to establish a new government. On May 23, 1949, the
government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
ratified its Constitution, the Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland.24 The Constitution empowers the federal government
to create federal laws,25 including general social laws that establish a
system of social welfare,26 and labor laws that include provisions for
social insurance and unemployment insurance. 27  The government
used this power to create the Social Insurance Code
(Sozialgesetzbuch ).28
Schwdche und Wechseldllen des Lebens schafft das Reich ein umfassendes
Versicherungswesen unter mafigebender Mitwirkung der Versicherten. " Id. at Art.
161.
22. Crew, supra note 17, at 6.
23. Id.
24. Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany) (1949).
25. "Der Bund hat... das Gesetzgebungsrecht[.]" Id. at Art. 72 § 2.
26. "Die konkurrierende Gesetzgebung erstreckt sich auf folgende Gebiete:
...die 6ffentliche Fiirsorge[]" Id. at Art. 74 § 1(8).
27. "Die konkurrierende Gesetzgebung erstreckt sich auf folgende Gebiete:
...das Arbeitsrecht entschlieilich... die Socialversichering einschlie3lich der
Arbeitslosenversicherung[.]" Id. at Art. 74 § 1(12).
28. The Social Insurance Code (Sozialgesetzbuch) was created to establish a
federal system of social welfare rights and benefits, including the right to receive
social insurance (Sozialversicherung), social welfare (Sozialhilfe), and employment
support (Arbeitsfdrderung), the latter of which includes monetary unemployment
benefits (Arbeitslosengeld). Sozialgesetzbuch 1 [SGB I] [Social Insurance Code I]
Once the Constitution was in place, Germans set out to rebuild
the rest of their country, enjoying incredible (indeed, "miraculous")
economic success during this process.29 However, not all Germans
were able to enjoy this success. Germans recognized that there was a
significant need for a system of federal assistance that would allow
retirees to share in the success of the country, rather than just manage
to avoid poverty.3 ° Accordingly, in 1957 Germany's pension system
changed to "pensions linked to past wages and increases in payout
amounts coupled with rising wage levels."'"
Despite the availability of federal unemployment and pension-
type benefits during this time, there were still many people who were
falling through the cracks and living in poverty in Germany.
Through its passage of the Federal Social Assistance Act
(Bundessozialhilfegesetz) of 1961, the government established a
federally-funded system of providing social welfare assistance to
Germany's poorest citizens. Under the Act, the government
distributed enough money to these people to "guarantee [them] a
civili[z]ed minimum income."32
In order to receive benefits under the Federal Social Assistance
Act, the recipient must first have exhausted all other sources of
Dec. 11, 1975, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGBI I] 3015, §§ 1, 4, 9, 19. See also
infra note 136 and accompanying text.
29. See JOHN ARDAUGH, GERMANY AND THE GERMANS 104-05 (1995).
Germany's rebuilding of itself, after it was left devastated at the end of World War
II, into "the free world's third most powerful economy," is widely referred to as a
"miracle." Id. at 104. Germany's economy managed to grow an average of 8%
throughout the decade of the 1950's, even though it had few of its own natural
resources. Id. at 104. Such success can also be attributed to other factors,
including the emergence of a highly-skilled labor force (which was maintained
throughout the post-war years through Germany's well-developed technical
apprenticeship system), among whose attributes were thoroughness and a high
degree of discipline. Id. at 105-06.
30. Deutsche Welle News Service, German Welfare State at a Turning Point,
Deutsche Welle Report on Current Affairs (Aug. 15, 2004), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1297218,00.html.
31. Id. The aim of the 1957 pension reforms was to "secure for the elderly an
independent life at a financial level comparable to that which they enjoyed during
working life." LUTz LEISERING & STEPHAN LEIBFRIED, TIME AND POVERTY AND
WESTERN WELFARE STATES-UNITED GERMANY IN PERSPECTIVE 295 (John Veit-
Wilson trans., 1995) [hereinafter Leisering & Leibfried].
32. Leisering & Leibfried, supra note 31, at 59.
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assistance. 33 Benefits were distributed under two main principles-
each recipient's individual situation must be evaluated to determine
the amount and type of benefits that would best provide for the
person, and benefits should be distributed according to a plan that
maximizes the recipient's ability to eventually live without them.34
However, the Act did not limit the amount of time a recipient could
receive social welfare benefits. It simply stated that it was intended
that recipients receive benefits "for a short period" without further
defining that period.35
Despite the "miraculous" success Germany had in rebuilding its
economy after the end of World War II, the country was not well-
equipped to handle the blows to the its economy that started in the
1970's and continue to the present day.
Many factors have contributed to the economic challenges that
Germany currently faces. Germany's industrial model is greatly
dependent on manufacturing high-quality consumer goods, which has
allowed it in some limited areas to perform better than other
countries.36 However, in some ways, German industry has not been
as technology-focused as other countries that have enjoyed more
robust economies from the 1970s onward.37
33. Id. at 60.
34 Id. at 60-61. The latter principle does not apply to certain groups, including
"children, old people, those who are ill or disabled, and those who have
responsibility for the care of children or other family members." Id. at 61. In
Germany, mothers of young children have been considered a legitimate segment of
this population, since they are not expected to work "until the children no longer
need care." Id. This is in direct contrast to the United States, where it is not only
socially acceptable, but expected, that poor single mothers work outside the home
to support themselves, rather than relying on welfare benefits from the government.
See id.
35. Id. at61.
36. One of those areas is the German automotive industry, which has
historically focused more on producing high-end (and high-priced) luxury cars than
its counterparts in Japan and the United States. See Ardaugh, supra note 29, at
ill.
37. Germany appears to have lagged behind countries like Japan in developing
its high-tech industry throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's, despite the fact
that there was such enormous worldwide demand for high-tech products during that
time. Id. at 117-18. It is clear that development of technology exports was not a
priority for German industry at this time: by 1995, "as manufacturers, German
German industry itself faces a unique problem-both the
government and the labor unions wield a tremendous amount of
control over German employers. German employees have
historically been the fortunate beneficiaries of a cooperative
relationship between labor and management, 38 which has made them
some of the highest paid and most protected workers in the world.39
Such legally-mandated favorable treatment of German employees
does not make it easy to run a business in Germany. German
companies that employ at least five people are required by law to
establish a works council (Betriebsrat) if the employees request
one.40  This council wields significant power within the corporate
infrastructure over many types of business decisions, including firing
and laying off employees.4' Without the council's approval, it can be
firms' share of world high-technology markets ha[d] fallen since 1972 from 26 to
17 per cent, as the Japanese surged ahead." Id. at 118.
38. Germany's legal system includes an "extensive and precise" set of labor
laws, and those governing such areas as job security and working conditions
mainly favor the employee. Id. at 127. Under these laws, German companies must
not only be good employers, but they must also maintain positive relationships with
labor unions. Id. at 128. The "cooperative labor relations system" that was in
place in West Germany after the war is widely credited for contributing to the
country's "economic miracle" because it does not foster the type of adversarial
relations between labor and management that can negatively effect a country's
economic growth. Charles J. Hobson & James B. Dworkin, West German Labor
Unrest: Are Unions Losing Ground to Worker Councils?, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Feb. 1986, at46.
39. Even as recently as 2002, "Germany has some of the highest industrial
wages... [and] the toughest job protection.. .in the industrial world." Europe: Here
are the Ideas. Now for Action?; German Labour-Market Reform, THE ECONOMIST,
Jun. 29, 2002, at 43 [hereinafter The Economist-Here are the Ideas].
40. BEAUFTRAGTE DER BUNDESREGIERUNG FOR MIGRATION, FLUCHTLINGE
UND INTEGRATION [FEDERAL COMMISSIONER FOR MIGRATION, REFUGEES AND
INTEGRATION], A MANUAL FOR GERMANY 117 (2nd ed. 2005) [hereinafter BBMFI
Manual]. Members of this council are elected by the company's employees. Id.
41. A company must consult with its works council on a many corporate
matters, including investing and financial planning, establishing worker safety
programs, and implementing workforce reduction plans. Id. See also Ardaugh,
supra note 29, at 130-31. It is in the area of workforce reduction that the council
and corporate management are most often at odds. Ardaugh, supra note 29, at 131.
Although management has the final decision as to whether to lay off or fire
employees, it must present its plans and valid reasons for doing so to the council
beforehand. Id.
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difficult to for companies to terminate employees.
42
Any labor relations difficulties faced by management of German
companies are compounded by the legal protections for workers
established under Germany's Protection Against Dismissal Act
(Kiindigungsschutzgesetz), which requires companies to offer, in
writing, a "socially justified" reason for firing most types of
employees. a3
Labor relations policies such as these can make it difficult and
prohibitively expensive to run a business in Germany. Accordingly,
the German economy has had to pay a heavy price-not only has the
profitability of its businesses suffered," but some businesses have
been forced to move their operations elsewhere. 45
In addition to problems related to business, the German
population has undergone a radical shift since the time plans for
42. As the personnel manager of a Stuttgart factory put it, if the company
proceeds with lay-offs or firings without the council's approval, "we usually find
ourselves taken to court." Id.
43. BBMFI Manual, supra note 40, at 120. The Protection Against Dismissal
Act's requirements apply to all employees who have worked for at least six months
at a company that employs at least ten people. Id. A reason is "socially justified"
if it is based on the "conduct or behavior of the employee or as a result of urgent
operational requirements." Id.
44. In 1984, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) reported that one of the three main problems facing the German economy
was the "low profitability of [its] industrial firms." Ardaugh, supra note 29, at 117.
In addition to labor relations issues, German employers have historically blamed
difficulties they have in turning a profit on being required to pay a high level of
social security and other taxes. See id.
45. Since Germany joined the European Union (EU), many German business
owners have moved their operations out of Germany and into other EU countries.
See Catherine Miller, Eager Poles Find German Jobs, BBC NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 9,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l1/hi/world/europe/4584616.stm. One German laundry
service, since relocating to Poland, can now operate twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week, because the Polish workers are willing to work longer hours and on
holidays. Id. The manager of the laundry service claims that relocating his
business was crucial for its survival, as "it would be incredibly hard to find workers
like that in Germany." Id. Ironically, this laundry service's chief clientele is
located in Germany-it launders sheets, towels, and robes for Berlin's high-end
hotels. Id. Cheaper Polish labor is causing problems throughout the eastern
portion of Germany. Id. In towns such as Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, where
unemployment is more than 17%, many jobs in industries like carpentry are going
to Polish workers, who will work for much less than their German counterparts. Id.
achieving the "economic miracle" were laid. These changes in the
population structure have exacerbated Germany's economic
problems. Germany's low birthrate46 forces a dwindling workforce
to pay into the social security coffers so that retired people can
continue to get their benefits.
Germany attempted to alleviate economic problems caused by the
low birthrate by bringing in guest workers (Gastarbeiter) from some
of Europe's poorer countries.47 The guest worker program, while
providing a needed low-skilled labor force, caused its share of
burdens on the German economy.48
Guest workers have provided only some of Germany's foreign
population. Recognizing that Germany had relatively liberal political
asylum laws, asylum seekers (Asylanten) from throughout the world
flocked there.4 9 Every asylum seeker was entitled under German law
to receive government-funded accommodation while their asylum
cases were under review. 50 In addition, since Germany is a member
46. In the mid-1970's and beyond, the birth rate in West Germany was one of
the lowest in the world. Ardaugh, supra note 29, at 200. The decline of the birth
rate of the 1970's made itself felt as early as 1990-while there were 1 million 16-
year-old Germans in 1982, there were only 650,000 in 1990. Id. at 134. Germany
continues to have a "dramatically low birthrate." In 2006 it was measured at 8.5
births per 1,000 inhabitants, which is one of the lowest rates in all of Europe.
Stefan Theil, No Kids, No Good, NEWSWEEK (INTERNATIONAL EDITION), Apr. 10-
17, 2006, at 8.
47. Id. at 273. Guest workers immigrated to Germany, mainly from Turkey
and other poor southern European countries, at the request of the German
government. Id. The Gastarbeiter program ended up bringing over four million
immigrants to Germany. Id. at 274.
48. While guest workers were often welcomed on their arrival in Germany
because of the desperate shortage of workers in local labor markets, animosity
between the guest workers and the local German citizens often grew due to cultural
and religious differences. Id. at 276-82. When the German economy took a
downturn in the 1980's, causing increased unemployment, German resentment of
the continued presence of guest workers still living and working in Germany grew,
even though the guest workers often took low-wage menial jobs that the Germans
did not want. Id. at 284.
49. Id. at 290. These asylum seekers started showing up in Germany in the
1980's, citing the need for political asylum due to persecution in their home
countries (which were typically in the third world or Eastern Europe). Id.
50. Id. Under Germany's liberal political asylum laws, German border guards
could not turn people away if they claimed to be seeking asylum. Id. This
remained the policy even as it became clear, as more and more asylum seekers
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of the European Union,5' citizens of any other European Union
country are free to travel to Germany and seek work there without
acquiring permission to do so from German immigration
authorities.5 2
Despite the large number of foreigners coming to Germany and
seeking either work, social benefits, or both, undoubtedly the largest
burden on the German economy in the late twentieth century came as
East and West Germany reunified. Since the Berlin Wall fell in
1989, the reunification process has placed a tremendous strain on
Germany.
In West Germany, they had to deal with yet another influx of
immigrants: ethnic Germans from the former East Germany and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 3 Although these immigrants came
came to Germany (99,650 in 1986, up from 74,000 in 1985), that many were
seeking better economic fortunes for themselves rather than protection from
persecution at home. Id. at 290-91. Asylum seekers lived in government-run
camps or hostels while waiting (sometimes as long as three years) for their asylum
cases to be heard. Id. at 291. While in Germany, asylum seekers can receive a
relatively small amount of social welfare benefits through the system established in
1993 under the Asylum Seekers Benefit Law (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz).
Leisering & Leibfried, supra note 31, at 30, 32, 62.
51. Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C 191). Germany was one of the
original countries to join the European Union when it signed the Treaty on
European Union in 1992. Id. This treaty was amended in 1997 by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which promoted further unity between the EU member states,
stressing the importance of maintaining a "high level of employment" throughout
the entire EU by "creation of an area without internal frontiers[.]" Treaty of
Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities, and Related Acts, art. 1 § 5, 1997 O.J. (C 340). In 2004,
this "area" was expanded to include 10 new member states, most of which are
former Communist states in Eastern Europe. EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR PRESS AND COMMUNICATION, KEY FACTS AND
FIGURES ABOUT EUROPE AND THE EUROPEANS 4 (2005),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu-glance/5 l/en.pdf. A detailed
discussion of the effects of EU laws on Germany's employment and social welfare
laws and policies is beyond the scope of this comment.
52. BBMFI Manual, supra note 40, at 95. Although citizens of other European
Union countries are free to come to Germany and look for work, they are not
eligible to receive any form of unemployment or other social assistance from the
German government while doing so. Id.
53. German law permits ethnic Germans to return to Germany and settle there.
Leisering & Leibfried, supra note 31, at 69.
seeking work, many of them ended up relying on social welfare
services when they were unable to find steady jobs.5 4
These new immigrants were not the only drain on the former
West Germany's economy. In the years directly following the
reunification, the former West collectively transferred approximately
150 billion Deutschmarks per year to former East German states.
55
Although this direct transfer program ended in 1995,56 that was not
the end of federal subsidies to the former East. Currently, those
subsidies are funded by the proceeds of a "solidarity tax" surcharge
on all federal taxpayers. 57 This means that at least until the year
2019,58 taxpayer funds originating in the former West will continue
to be funneled directly into the former East, rather than being used to
help build local economies. 59
Despite such extensive financial support from the federal
government since reunification, 60 the former East Germany's
economy has suffered greatly. Among the problems it continues to
54. This placed a tremendous burden on West Germany's social welfare
systems; for example, 46% of applicants for welfare benefits in the city of Bremen
(in the former West) did so because they were recent immigrants in need of
assistance. Id. at 71.
55. Arthur B. Gunlicks, German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts, 6
GERMAN L.J. 1288 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Id. The German government passed the Solidarity Pact I in 1995, which
levied a 7.5% federal solidarity tax surcharge against all German citizens and
corporations. Id. The rate was reduced to 5.5% in 1998, at which it still currently
stands. Id.
58. Since it became clear that the former East would still have funding needs
after the Solidarity Pact I was set to expire in 2005, the government passed
Solidarity Pact II, which extended the federal subsidy payment program until 2019.
Id. at 1288-89.
59. This federal subsidy program is widely criticized for what is seen as a
profound lack of success, resulting in rising unemployment figures in the former
East and taxes in the former West, without producing substantial economic growth
for the country as a whole. See Robert J. Barro, South Korea: How to Keep the
Miracle Going, Bus. WK. 28, June 9, 2003, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_23/b383603 1_mzOO7.htm.
60. By 2005, it was estimated that the cost of rebuilding the former East
Germany had, up to that point, totaled E1.25 trillion. Tim Weber, Waiting for the
East to Flourish, BBC NEWS, Sept. 9, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/business/4225346.stm.
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face are extremely high unemployment 61 and a mass westward
exodus of its young and highly-educated citizens.62  However,
perhaps what cripples most states, cities and towns in the former East
is the general belief that the subsidies will end and the money will
run out before enough infrastructure changes can be made to make
those areas viable in a modem capitalist society.63
All of these factors together create a situation ripe for change.
Facing his country's severe economic and unemployment problems,
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and his economic advisors
embarked on an ambitious plan, "Agenda 2010," that implemented
sweeping labor law reforms. 64 Many Germans found these reforms
drastic and unwelcome, not only because they changed how
unemployment benefits would be administered, but also because they
61. In 2005, unemployment statistics painted a bleak picture in the former
East: 18.6% unemployment across the entire region, reaching as high as 25% in
some areas. Id. Some citizens of the former East Germany, because of the
difficulty of finding jobs there, end up seeking their fortunes far from home. Id.
One of the more creative of these individuals is Gunter V61ker, a former soldier in
the German army who recently opened a German restaurant in the Kurdish region
of Iraq. Ein "Deutscher Hof" im Irak (A "German Restaurant" in Iraq),
AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Apr. 22, 2006, at 9. V61ker, who is
originally from the former East German state of Thilringen, cites two reasons for
doing this: that living in Germany no longer suits him, and that in his home in the
former East there are "more Hartz IV recipients than job openings." ("...mehr
Harz-IV-Emphanger als offene Stellen.") Id. Hartz-IV benefits are those the
German government pays to the long-term unemployed. See infra Part III-B.
62. Stefan Berg et al., The Price of Failed Reunification, DER SPIEGEL
(Christopher Sultan trans., Sept. 5, 2005),
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/intemational/spiegel/O, 1518,373639,00.html. This is
clear in places like Weisswasser, a city in the former East German state of Saxony,
whose population since reunification has dwindled down to mostly elderly
residents. Id. For Weisswasser, this means that "[t]he only businesses that have a
future.. .are nursing homes." Id.
63. Id. For example, the state of Brandenburg in the former East currently
receives, on a per capita basis, 40% more federal funding than its western neighbor,
Schleswig-Holstein. Id. Despite their desperate need to fund their modernization
projects, state officials in Brandenburg and elsewhere in the former East are very
aware that their problems will be compounded if they do not save some of the
subsidy money before the subsidy program ends in 2019. See id.
64. See generally PRESS INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OF GERMANY, AGENDA 2010 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (English ed. 2004) (Feb.
2004), http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/Agenda_2010_brochureengl.pdf
[hereinafter Agenda 2010 Questions and Answers].
significantly lowered the amount of benefits that the long-term
unemployed were eligible to receive.65
B. History of Social Welfare in the United States
In the United States in the late 1800's, social welfare benefits
were not provided by the government, but by private charities. 66
These charities operated on the idea that only those who truly could
not work were deserving of receiving charitable assistance.67 Those
who were truly poor but did not want to be chastised for being lazy
often avoided seeking assistance from these private charities, opting
instead to go to soup kitchens and to use YMCA dinner tickets.68
During this time, charities believed that categorizing the needy
was the first step in determining how best to help them.69 However,
such categorization probably created more problems than it solved, as
it often reflected subjective moral judgments about them, rather than
objective criteria. 70 In fact, arbitrary categorization was one of the
65. Infra note 183 and accompanying text.
66. Schlabach, supra note 10. The government did not have a wide-reaching
system in place for providing assistance the poor despite the fact that
unemployment was practically a national crisis in 1877 (numbering as high as 20%
of the workforce). Id. However, some poor people managed to receive some
assistance from public poor law officials. Id. In addition, some states were starting
to establish ways to assist poor citizens. Id.
67. Id. One of the largest charitable organizations in the country at the time
would only help people who could prove they could not work due to illness or
some other legitimate reason, and would not help those they believed could work
but were too lazy to do so. Id. Disdain for "able-bodied adult paupers" ran
rampant during this time--even the President of the New York Board of Charities
described them as "the most limpsy, hopelessly inert, and utterly good-for-nothing
objects in the world[.]" Id. (quoting William P. Letchworth, President's Address,
NCCC [National Conference of Charities and Correction] Proceedings (1884)).
68. Schlabach, supra note 10. YMCA dinner tickets were typically bought by
wealthy people to give to poor people. Id.
69 Id.
70. Id. The Charity Organization Society (COS), which was imported from
England and operated in 52 cities by the late 1880's, established four working
categories of indigent people: those deserving "permanent relief," those deserving
"temporary relief because of sickness, death, accident, and such causes," those who
were employable and only needed jobs, and those undeserving of any relief at all.
Id.
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main difficulties faced by charities across the nation as they
attempted to establish a centralized and efficient system of
distributing assistance to the poor. 71
People who received charitable assistance were directly
supported by charity volunteers, who paid "friendly visits" on the
72poor. These volunteers used their personal judgment to determine
the true level of neediness, which further exacerbated any problems
caused by arbitrary categorization.73
Toward the end of the 19th century, some of the individual states
began to contemplate providing certain types of social assistance.74
In 1911, valid laws establishing mothers' pensions 75 and workmen's
compensation were passed in some states.76  By then the federal
71. Id. Arbitrary categorization, because it lacked distinct criteria for
determining whether or not to give assistance to people, undermined the efforts of
individual charities across the nation to establish a streamlined, organized system
of providing financial help. Id. Private charities had a hard time achieving their
other goals as well, such as establishing a practical plan of helping people become
self-sufficient, rather than indefinitely dependent on charitable assistance. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. "Friendly visit" volunteers are considered to be the original version of
the modem case worker. Id. These volunteers got to know the people they visited
on a personal level, and used that knowledge, rather than a distinct set of
organizational rules, to determine the level of need. Id. Eventually, private
charities determined that the "relational approach" to social welfare, in which need
is determined through establishing relationships with the poor, was certainly no
worse an approach to delivering social welfare benefits than "surrounding [a poor
person] with a set of thoroughly dependable, well-engineered, protective welfare
institutions[.]" Id.
74. Id. New York led the way, passing a bill that would provide state benefits
to some parents in 1897. Id. The bill was vetoed so that law never took effect. Id.
Other states apparently tried to pass workman's compensation laws, which ended
up being "either dead letters, or, in the opinion of the courts, unconstitutional." Id.
75. Financial assistance to single mothers reflected society's desire to provide
a "safety net for children of widows." See Elizabeth C. Hair et al., How Do
Maternal Risk Factors Affect Children in Low-Income Families? Further Evidence
of Two-Generational Implications, in THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK:
PROCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND OUTCOMES 66 (Sharon Telleen & Judith V. Sayad
eds., 2002). Of course, as more never-married mothers filled the welfare rolls,
many critics of the welfare system called for reforms that would encourage these
mothers to work outside the home to earn an income rather than depend on welfare
benefits. Id.
76. Schlabach, supra note 10.
government already had a workmen's compensation law for federal
employees, which was passed in 1908. 77
In 1934 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in response to the Great
Depression, announced his intention to establish a federal social
security system.78 This system would be designed to protect the
economic security of people who, as was the current trend, gave up
their family farms and moved to cities to seek out industrial jobs.79
Based on the recommendations of an executive committee formed to
study this problem, 80 the Social Security Act 81 was created, which
was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by
President Roosevelt on August 14, 1935.82
Administration of programs under the Social Security Act was
originally charged to the Social Security Board, which was
transferred to the Federal Security Agency in 1939.83 In 1953, the
federal government created the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, which replaced the Federal Security Agency. 84
The Social Security Act has been amended many times
throughout its history to meet the changing needs of the country. The
original Social Security Act provided benefits to retired workers, as
well as elderly and blind people with financial need.8 5 In 1939, it
was amended to include additional categories of recipients
77. Id. Workman's compensation laws were seen as a critical response to the
increasing industrialization of American industry that was taking place in the early
20th century, because a systematic and organized method of responding to
accidents and compensating their victims was needed. See id.
78. UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY-
A BRIEF HISTORY 2 (Aug. 2005), http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/2005pamphlet.pdf
[hereinafter USSSA-Brief History Pamphlet].
79. Id.
80. This committee was known as the Committee on Economic Security,
which included several officers in the President's executive cabinet. Id. at 2-3.
81. Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 405 (2005)).
82. USSSA-Brief History Pamphlet, supra note 78, at 3.
83. Id. at 21.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3, 12.
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(dependents and survivors).86 In 1956 the Act was changed to
authorize payments of disability benefits.8 7 By 1969, it became clear
to President Nixon that the way benefits were paid out to the elderly,
the blind, and the disabled (the welfare system's three "adult
categories") needed to change.8 8 Up to that point, state and local
governments, supported by federal finding, administered programs
providing aid to those recipients, creating a system of widely varying
payment amounts from state to state. 89 In order to "bring reason,
order, and purpose into a tangle of overlapping programs," President
Nixon created the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program in 1972.90
The Social Security Act has also frequently been amended to
address economic concerns about the program. For example, in
response to the suggestions from the executively-appointed
Greenspan Commission, in 1983 President Ronald Reagan amended
the Social Security Act to make Social Security benefits subject to
federal taxation, along with raising the retirement age. 91
Administrative restructuring has also continued throughout the
Social Security Act's history. In 1980, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare became the Department of Health and Human
Services, which was responsible for administering all Social Security
Act programs until the mid-1990's. 92  In 1995, the federal
government established a separate agency, the Social Security
Administration, 93 which assumed primary responsibility for the
administration of the following Social Security Act programs: Social
Security ("old-age" pensions), survivors benefits, disability benefits,
86. Id. at 6. The spouse and minor children of a retired worker were eligible
for dependents benefits, while in the event of a worker's premature death the
worker's family received survivors benefits. Id.
87. Id. at 9. Under the 1956 amendments, disabled workers between the ages
of fifty and sixty-five gained benefits eligibility, as did adult children who were
disabled. Id. at 9. Benefits eligibility was later expanded to include all disabled
workers, regardless of their age. Id.
88. USSSA-Brief History Pamphlet, supra note 78, at 12.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id. at 23.
and SSI. 94 The Department of Health and Human Services remained
responsible for administering benefits related to public welfare.
Federal agencies do not pay welfare benefits directly to
individuals. Instead, Title 42 of the Social Security Act authorizes
the federal government to give money to the states, which the states
can use to establish their own social welfare services. 95 Since neither
the federal government nor the states themselves are under a
constitutional mandate to provide welfare benefits,96 the states have
a large degree of flexibility and autonomy in establishing social
welfare programs-not only in determining the types and amounts of
benefits to provide, but also in establishing eligibility limits.97
III. RECENT LARGE-SCALE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM REFORMS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
The welfare reforms passed by the United States' federal
government in 1996 provide more strict guidelines for how the states
can distribute federal money to people as social welfare benefits.98
Although these reforms appear to be dissimilar to those
implemented by the German government in 2005 that affected long-
term unemployment benefits,99 the governments of both countries
shared a common goal when they implemented their respective
reforms. By drastically reducing people's eligibility for social
assistance, they hoped to get those people off the public assistance
rolls and back to work as quickly as possible.
94. Social Security Independence and Program Improvement Act of 1994, 103
P.L. 296 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 901 (2005)).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2005). States are to use these funds to meet certain
goals, including fostering achievement of economic self-sufficiency among
indigent people, eliminating abuse of children and vulnerable adults, replacing
institutional care with home-based care where appropriate, and providing services
to those people who require institutional care. Id. at (1)-(5). See also id. at §
1397a(2).
96. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
97. See id. But see Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
(ruling that if the state decides to provide public welfare benefits, "it cannot
arbitrarily exclude a segment of the resident population from their enjoyment").
98. See infra Part III-A.
99. See infra Part III-B.
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A. Welfare Reform in the United States-
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PR WORA)
During the 1992 Presidential campaign, Democratic candidate
Bill Clinton pledged to "end welfare as we know it." 100 The 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), was the culmination of a joint effort between President
Clinton and the Republican-controlled Congress.' 0' After Clinton
vetoed the first two bills Congress sent,'0 2 he signed Congress' third
version of the PRWORA into law,'0 3 declaring, "[w]e are taking an
historic chance to make welfare what it was meant to be: a second
chance, not a way of life."104
The PRWORA replaced Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), a 60-year-old federal program that provided
100. WELFARE REFORM 7 (Charles P. Cozic ed., Greenhaven Press 1997).
101. See Press Conference by President Bill Clinton upon the signing of
PRWORA into law (July 31, 1996), in WELFARE REFORM 40-44 (Charles P. Cozic
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Clinton's PRWORA Press Conference].
102. Hugh Heclo, The Politics of Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF
WELFARE 193 (2001). In vetoing these two bills, President Clinton focused
specifically on their unacceptable elements, portraying them as a Republican attack
on the social safety net for middle America. Id. This forced the Republican-
controlled Congress to concede in some areas to get the bill signed. Id. at 193-94.
The Republicans did so because they had their own campaign promises to keep--
under the "Contract With America," a campaign tool the Republican Party used to
gain control of Congress, Republicans promised a drastic overhaul to the welfare
system. See id. at 190-9 1.
103. Id. at 194. During his bill-signing press conference, President Clinton
stated that "[s]ome parts of this bill go too far" and indicated that he was
"determined to see them corrected." Clinton's PRWORA Press Conference, supra
note 101, at 43. The President regretted cuts to "excess shelter reduction," which
provided additional food stamps to poor working families who faced high housing
costs. Id. He was also "deeply disappointed" that Congress insisted on including a
provision that denied certain types of medical and other help to legal immigrants.
Id.
104. Welfare Reform, supra note 100, at 7. At his July 31, 1996 press
conference, President Clinton explained his intentions for the reforms: "[The
welfare system] should be about moving people from welfare to work. It should
give people the child care and the health care they need to move from welfare to
work without hurting their children." Clinton's PRWORA Press Conference,
supra note 101, at 41.
assistance to needy individuals and families, with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), 10 5 a program that provided
block grants that states could use to establish and run welfare-to-
work programs to help people achieve self-sufficiency rather than
continued indefinite reliance on welfare benefits.10 6
The PRWORA establishes certain regulations for state programs
supported by TANF grants, including time limits for receipt of
welfare benefits' 0 7 and requirements associated with moving
recipients from welfare to work. 10 8 It also establishes penalties for
those states whose programs fail to meet federal requirements.0 9
The stated purpose of the PRWORA, however, is not to set forth
a mandatory welfare program design for all the states to follow, but
to give the states flexibility in determining how to operate their
welfare programs in accordance with the federal government's
goals."l 0  Accordingly, states have some autonomy under the
105. 64 Fed. Reg. 17720 (Apr. 12, 1999).
106. Specific goals were to get more welfare recipients into the labor force by
setting up TANF-funded programs to help them get and keep jobs. Sharon Telleen,
Challenges to Welfare Reform, in THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK:
PROCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND OUTCOMES 1 (Sharon Telleen & Judith V. Sayad
eds., 2002). Legislators reasoned that this would lower the number of welfare case
loads and the rate of poverty among families and children. Id. Unfortunately, the
latter goal was often not met because many of the jobs available to former welfare
recipients did not pay enough to lift them out of poverty. Id. at 3.
107. The state is required to adhere to certain primary welfare-to-work
standards, including the restriction that TANF funds cannot be used to give welfare
recipients cash benefits for more than five years. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (2005).
However, the state can reduce the five-year limit if it wishes to do so. Id. States
are still allowed to provide certain types of support to citizens whose TANF
benefits expire. Specifically, the state may provide vouchers for certain state social
welfare services funded by separate non-TANF federal block grants. Id. at §
1397(a)(f).
108. Each state must implement a welfare-to-work plan in which welfare
recipients, in order to ensure continued receipt of benefits, are required to work
after a maximum of two years on the welfare rolls. Id. at § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii). A
recipient is considered to be working if he or she is engaged in "work activities" for
a certain number of hours per week. Id at § 607(c)(1)(A).
109. Failure to ensure that welfare recipients are either working in traditional
jobs or participating in work-related activities within the prescribed time periods
results in the state accruing financial penalties. See id. at §609.
110. Id. at § 60 1(a). Each state's program must be designed to meet the
following four goals:
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PRWORA to determine how to run their TANF programs, such as an
option to exempt a certain percentage of its welfare recipients from
TANF work requirements.' This autonomy is not unlimited,
however. For example, states cannot develop programs that provide
more strict limits on recipients of welfare benefits than those outlined
in the federal regulations. 112
The federal agency responsible for overseeing the TANF program
is the Office of Family Assistance (OFA), a subdivision of the
Administration for Children and Families (AFC), which operates
under the Department of Health and Human Services. 1 3 Operation
of the OFA is part of the ACF's responsibility to administer federal
programs that "promote the economic and social well-being of
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be
cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives;
(2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits
by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing
and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and
(4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families.
Id. at § 601(a)(1)-(4). See also Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement after
Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
13, 24 (2005).
111. The PRWORA included a sliding scale that outlined participation
requirements in TANF programs. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)-(b) (2005). Specifically, it
mandated that, by 2002, at least fifty percent of all families that received welfare
benefits participate in a TANF welfare-to-work program (ninety percent of two-
parent families). Id. This regulation provides states with flexibility to exempt
certain recipients from the TANF work requirements without risking losing their
federal grant money.
112. See Comacho v. Texas Workforce Comm'n, 408 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.
2005). Texas state law required welfare recipients to adhere to what it called
"TANF Core activities," under which fell "job search and job readiness assistance"
activities. Id. at 233. These included not selling, using or possessing illicit drugs,
along with ensuring that their kids not only attend school regularly, but also get
regular medical checkups, dental checkups, and immunizations. Id. at 234. A
federal appeals court ruled that, while Texas did have some flexibility under the
statute to define "work activities," its definition could not extend beyond the scope
of the PRWORA, and that its TANF program could not use such infractions alone
to deny benefits to welfare recipients. See id. at 236-37.
113. See 67 Fed. Reg. 67198 (Nov. 4, 2002).
families, children, individuals, and communities. ' 1 4  TANF
Administrators, who are ACF employees, are responsible for
facilitating grants of TANF funds to states and ensuring that they are
used in accordance with federal guidelines."l
5
Just because a state creates a program that adheres to TANF
guidelines does not automatically mean that it is providing optimal
assistance to those who need it. These programs are mainly tasked
with getting people off welfare and back to work, the difficulty of
which can be exacerbated by the fact that most of the people on
welfare are single mothers" 6 who lack sufficient education and skills
to become successful in the job market." 7  These women face
additional obstacles to supporting themselves and their children
through full-time work, including difficulties in finding reliable child
care, substance abuse and other health problems, a lack of reliable
transportation, and few jobs for which they are qualified that pay
much more than minimum wage." 8
Because of such problems, social welfare agencies face an uphill
battle in implementing successful TANF programs. The PRWORA
requires that programs funded by TANF grants initially evaluate the
skills of the welfare recipient, then create a personal responsibility
plan outlining the services the person will need (education, training,
and job placement) to move them off welfare and into the
workforce. " 9
114. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FACT SHEET (Sept.
2004), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/factsheets/acffactsheet.html.
115. Lucia Rojas Smith et al., Welfare Reform and Women's Health:
Challenges and Opportunities to Advance the Public Response to the Health Needs
of Poor Women Through Monitoring and Collaboration, in THE TRANSITION FROM
WELFARE TO WORK: PROCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND OUTCOMES 133 (Sharon
Telleen & Judith V. Sayad eds., 2002).
116. See Sharon Telleen & Steven Andes, The Social Ecology of the Transition
to Work, in THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK: PROCESSES, CHALLENGES,
AND OUTCOMES 14 (Sharon Telleen & Judith V. Sayad eds., 2002).
117. See id. at 23.
118. See ALVIN L. SCHORR, WELFARE REFORM-FAILURES & REMEDIES 31-32
(2001).
119. Irene Banias, The Effects of Welfare-to- Work Legislation on Children and
Mothers: A Legal Overview, in THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK:
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Agencies that operate welfare-to-work programs have used
varying approaches to the challenges presented by TANF regulations
and their clients. A common approach is to provide a brief training
program that focuses primarily on teaching participants the skills
required to do a specific jobJ 20 This approach meets the goal of
quick entry into the workforce, but it is not necessarily effective in
the long term, because even if the participants have learned the basic
skills they need to do the job, they are often completely ill-equipped
to retain those positions.' 21 Specifically, they are often so unprepared
to deal with the ancillary challenges of entering the workforce, their
caseworkers must continue to provide long-term case management
support, 122 which often makes client job retention a caseworker's
most daunting challenge. 123
Based on these factors, it seems clear that a TANF welfare-to-
work program probably cannot be successful if it only provides a
short job training course. Former welfare recipients appear to require
continued support from caseworkers, an expensive and time-
consuming proposition that involves a high level of commitment
from agencies that run TANF programs.
Some early critics of the PRWORA believed that those who
created the reforms did not take these challenges into account,
complaining that any reforms mandating welfare-to-work programs
and time limits on the receipt of benefits could not be successful
because of the limited employability of former welfare recipients.1
24
PROCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND OUTCOMES 10 (Sharon Telleen & Judith V. Sayad
eds., 2002).
120. See Joseph R. Ferrari, et al., Providing Financial Empowerment to
Mothers on Welfare: Pilot Evaluations of a Hospitality Training Program, in THE
TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK: PROCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND OUTCOMES
97 (Sharon Telleen & Judith V. Sayad eds., 2002).
121. See Telleen & Andes, supra note 116, at 25, 34.
122. Id. at 28. Such challenges are mainly related to adjusting to basic aspects
of life as a working person, including being supervised and evaluated by others,
ensuring proper care of the person's family, and dealing with any mental or
physical health problems that affect the person's ability to do the job effectively.
See id. at 25, 34.
123. Id. at 25.
124. The Women's Alliance warned that "[w]elfare reform without job
creation is just putting women and children in back alleys to die[J" because
restricting how long they can receive benefits will eventually force ineligible
Welfare and women's rights activists also complained that welfare
reforms based on the Personal Responsibility Act 125 were not only
paternalistic, but also cruel to the vast number of women who
depended on the existing system for their survival. 126 The reforms'
cruelty and misguidedness were common complaints from those who
were unhappy about them. 127
Still other critics focused on the effects of the reforms on
women's rights, claiming that reforming welfare in such a way that
prevents welfare recipients who have additional children from
receiving additional benefits (known as a "family cap" policy) is a
violation of women's reproductive rights 128 that may be
recipients into a job market that is already saturated with unemployed people.
Women's Alliance, End Poverty as We Know It (Not Welfare!), RESIST (May/Jun.
1994), reprinted as Welfare Reform Is a Mistake in WELFARE REFORM 27-34
(Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997). Professor of Social Work Mimi Abramovitz had a
problem with placing time limits on benefits eligibility as a method to motivate
welfare recipients to work, since recipients often cannot get a job due to "lack of
education and skills, illness, disability, or emotional problems." See Mimi
Abramovitz, Welfare and Women's Lives, DEMOCRATIC LEFT (May/Jun. 1995),
reprinted as Welfare Reform Violates Women 's Rights in WELFARE REFORM 36
(Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997). The former Dean of New York University's School
of Social Work, Alvin Schorr, saw similar problems--many welfare recipients, due
to not finishing high school, having learning disabilities, or being illiterate, are not
sufficiently educated to qualify for anything beyond "lower-tier" and "poorly paid"
jobs. Schorr, supra note 118, at 31. Such recipients, according to Schorr, may
have further trouble getting or keeping jobs due to a lack of reliable transportation
or personal health problems. Id. at 32.
125. The Personal Responsibility Act outlined welfare reforms recommended
by Republican Party in its 1994 Congressional campaign tool, the Contract With
America. See supra note 102.
126. Welfare-rights activist Betty Reid Mandell believed that welfare reform
effectively "[took] away the economic life-line of poor women and children" and
would only serve to "make their lives vastly more miserable than they already
are...." Betty Reid Mandell, Shredding the Safety Net, NEW POLITICS (Summer
1995), reprinted as Poor Women and Children Need Welfare in WELFARE REFORM
10, 12 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997).
127. Dean Schorr summed up TANF as follows: "TANF is a mean program,
mean in design and meanly administered. It spreads pain and mischief and it will
not achieve any decent national purpose at a reasonable social cost." Schorr, supra
note 118, at x, 45.
128. The former co-chair of the Women's Committee of 100 (an advocacy
group opposing punitive welfare reforms), believes that a "family cap" policy,
which states can use to limit TANF benefits paid to support a child born to a
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unconstitutional. 129
While some believe that such reforms go too far, others feel they
do not do enough to fix the system's inherent problems. A common
argument from these critics is that the reforms do not do enough to
end illegitimacy by encouraging marriage and the establishment of
two-parent families.1 30 While these critics do not always display the
kindest sense of the true nature and needs of people on welfare, 131
welfare mother, "impairs reproductive rights because it punishes and deters a
recipient's choice to complete a pregnancy." Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women:
Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 79, 85-86 (2001). It has been suggested that legislators, based on their
understanding of poor women's typical reproductive choices, consider "family cap"
laws necessary because they punish poor women who "make reproductive
decisions in an entrepreneurial profit-seeking manner." Anna Marie Smith, The
Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State
Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121,174 (2002).
129. Implementing a family cap policy may be unconstitutional because it
"intrudes on poor mothers' fundamental constitutional rights to make decisions
concerning intimate family matters, such as when to bear children." Susan L.
Thomas, "Ending Welfare as We Know It, " or Farewell to the Rights of Women on
Welfare? A Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of the Personal
Responsibility Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 179, 195 (2001).
130. Conservatives complained that the problem with the Clinton
Administration's original welfare reform proposal was that it failed to deal with
illegitimacy. See Robert Rector, WELFARE REFORM, ISSUES '96: THE CANDIDATES
BRIEFING BOOK (The Heritage Foundation, 1996), reprinted as Welfare Reform is
Necessary, in WELFARE REFORM 45-46 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997). Specifically,
Clinton's proposal did not "address persistent problems of additional out-of-
wedlock births among women" currently on welfare. Id. at 46. According to
Rector, the pre-reform welfare system had the opposite effect; by giving single
mothers money and not requiring them to work, it effectively "block[ed] the
formation of intact two-parent families." Id. at 61.
131. Some conservative critics have clear contempt for welfare recipients and
the system itself: "[t]he actual number of individuals languishing our welfare rolls
as squalid dependents... [is] nearly 20 million souls in all," basically amounting to
"human wreckage." Karl Zinsmeister, Chance of a Lifetime, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE (Jan./Feb. 1995), reprinted as Welfare Reform Should Emphasize
Family Unity, in WELFARE REFORM 81-82 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997).
Zinsmeister's solution to this problem was to establish "cultural and economic
encouragements to keep parents together in peaceful, intact homes." Id. at 84.
However, Zinsmeister undermines his own argument by citing the following
statistics: 40% of welfare mothers are "serious drug abusers," many of whom are
"miserably educated" and have "deep emotional problems" and "few basic
disciplines." Id. at 83.
there is historical' 32 and statistical 133 support for their belief that
families headed by single mothers have a higher likelihood of being
forced to rely on social welfare benefits.
There are still other critics who wonder why we even have a
welfare system at all, and believe that rather than trying to reform it
through programs like TANF, it should just be eliminated instead.13 4
Making reforms to a social welfare system is a sensitive, difficult,
and politically-charged task for any government to undertake, as
evidenced by the strong and sometimes emotional reactions to the
passage of PRWORA in 1996. Regardless of how people felt about
them, however, the PRWORA and its system of TANF grants
became, and still is, the mechanism by which federal money was
distributed as welfare benefits to needy Americans.
B. Welfare Reform In Germany-
The Agenda 2010 Labor Market Reforms
Beginning in 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der and the
German government began implementing a series of labor market
reforms that were primarily intended to eliminate problems
associated with the country's high unemployment rate. These
reforms had a profound impact on one element of Germany's social
132. Schlabach, supra note 10. A study conducted on recipients of social
welfare assistance from private charities in 1906 and 1907 showed that one-third of
the families included children being raised by a single mother. Id. Of course,
widowhood was much more prevalent at that time than either divorce or single
motherhood. Id.
133. A U.S. Census Bureau report outlining changes in the poverty rate
between 1996 and 1999 indicated that people in a family headed by a single female
were more likely to be under the poverty line than those in families headed by a
married couple. JOHN ICELAND, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING: POVERTY 1996-1999 3 (Jul. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p70-91 .pdf.
134. Michael Tanner, Director for Health and Welfare Studies for the Cato
Institute, concludes that we must "recognize that welfare cannot be reformed. It
should be ended. There may be relatively little that can be done for people already
on welfare. They key issue is to avoid bringing more people into the cycle of
welfare, ... [which can only be done by] abolish[ing the] programs." Michael
Tanner, Ending Welfare as We Know It, USA TODAY MAGAZINE (Mar. 1995),
reprinted as Welfare Should be Eliminated, in WELFARE REFORM 92-93 (Charles P.
Cozic ed., 1997).
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welfare system-the payment of benefits to the long-term
unemployed.
Until January 1, 2005,135 Germany's social welfare insurance
system featured three separate types of benefits: unemployment
insurance (Arbeitslosengeld), assistance to the unemployed
(Arbeitslosenhilfe), and social welfare (Sozialhilfe).13 6
German Arbeitslosengeld (literally translated, "unemployment
money") is similar to the unemployment insurance provided by the
Social Security Administration in the United States. In Germany,
employers and employees pay into the Arbeitslosengeld system,
which then pays out benefits to workers when they become
unemployed. 137 The length of time that an unemployed worker can
receive Arbeitslosengeld varies, depending on how long the worker
has been eligible to work, and can last from six to thirty-two
months.' 38 Payment amounts under the Arbeitslosengeld system vary
from 60% to 67% of the wages earned in the previous job. 139
Unlike Arbeitslosengeld, the German system of providing
extended and indefinite financial assistance to the unemployed,
Arbeitslosenhilfe, was funded by federal tax money. Under this
program, the German government provided Arbeitslosenhilfe
payments, valued at 53% to 57% of the previous income, to the long-
135. The labor market reforms that changed the social welfare benefit payment
system, recommended by the Hartz Commission, went into effect on January 1,
2005. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
136. ARD News Service, Arbeitsmarktreform [Labor Market Reform], ARD-
MITASGMAGAZINE SPECIAL REPORT (Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://www.br-
online.de/politik-
wirtschaft/mittagsmagazin/dynamisch/specials/Arbeitsosenhilfereform/Arbeitslose
nhilfereform.htm [hereinafter ARD].
137. Id.
138. Id. The original Arbeitslosengeld (federal unemployment insurance
system) was not affected by the Agenda 2010 labor market reforms, except that
benefits paid out under it are now called Arbeitslosengeld L Id. German workers
who become unemployed are still entitled to receive Arbeitslosengeld I payments
depending on how long they were employed and whether they contributed to the
federal social security system. BBMFI Manual, supra note 40, at 123, 129. The
Agenda 2010 reforms affect the benefits an unemployed person can receive after
the expiration of his or her eligibility to receive Arbeitslosengeld I payments. See
infra note 176 and accompanying text.
139. ARD, supra note 136.
term unemployed whose eligibility for Arbeitslosengeld payments
had expired.
140
The Employment Offices of Germany's Federal Employment
Agency (Arbeitsdmter der Bundesanstaltfir Arbeit) were responsible
for paying out both Arbeitslosengeld and Arbeitslosenhilfe benefits to
the unemployed people. 14' Workers in these offices spent a lot of
time calculating Arbeitslosenhilfe benefits for the long-term
unemployed (because they were based on certain percentages of the
former income), leaving them less time to help these people find
jobs. 142
The federal government knew that paying out Arbeitslosenhilfe
benefits to the long-term unemployed was causing an unbearable
financial strain on the country, and it realized that Arbeitslosenhilfe
benefits were so generous that those who were receiving them lacked
motivation to give them up to take lower-paying jobs.143  It
concluded, therefore, that the current system of indefinite and
generous Arbeitslosenhilfe benefits was unsustainable.
In coming up with a solution to this problem, government
officials reasoned that consolidating the benefits available to the
long-term unemployed into a single (lower) monthly payment would
not only motivate those who could work to find a job, but would also
increase federal and municipal monetary resources that could be used
to expand and improve job programs. 44 Accordingly, it decided to
create a new system of benefits for the long-term unemployed, which
would be based on the current system of social welfare benefits,
which were calculated differently.
140. Id. Under the Agenda 2010 reforms, the Arbeitslosenhilfe program has
been eliminated, and the long-term unemployed now receive Arbeitslosengeld II,
which consists of a fixed-term monthly amount, rather than a percentage of the
former income. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
141. ARD, supra note 136.
142. See The Economist-Here are the Ideas, supra note 39, at 43.
143. See id.
144. This type of "downward ladder" policy reflects the theory of social risk
management that advocates, rather than the eliminating all poverty through an
indefinite and generous system of government handouts, viewing some types of
poverty as socially acceptable because those who face it will be scared enough of it
to figure out a way to work. See Leisering & Leibfried, supra note 31, at 34.
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People who were unable to work due to health problems were
entitled to receive Sozialhilfe (social welfare) benefits. 145  The
Sozialhilfe system was administered not by the federal government,
but by local municipal governments, 146 which were free to adjust the
flat-rate payment according to the recipient's potential income, the
value of the assets owned by the recipient and his or her spouse or
partner, and the number of family members in the household.
47
The federal government determined that it would pay long-term
unemployment benefits, but that they would resemble Sozialhilfe (a
flat-rate payment that could be adjusted based on the availability of
other resources to the recipient). 148 This idea became one of the main
elements of the Agenda 2010 labor market reforms. 49 Starting in
January 2003, the German government began implementing a series
of laws recommended by the Hartz Commission, 150 whose chief aim
was to provide a regulatory structure for those reforms. 151
145. ARD, supra note 136.
146. The federal government, in an effort to limit the amount of benefits it paid
out under its unemployment benefits programs (and balance the social welfare
burdens borne by the federal and state governments), often tried to transfer
recipients of Arbeitslosenhilfe to the local governments' Sozialhilfe rolls. Leisering
& Leibfried, supra note 31, at 32.
147. ARD, supra note 136.
148. See The Economist-Here are the Ideas, supra note 39, at 43.
149. Agenda 2010 represents a broad package of reforms implemented by the
German government which are intended to restore Germany's economy to its
former position as one of the world's top economies by the year 2010. Agenda
2010 Questions and Answers, supra note 64, at 4. While reforming the system of
benefits for the long-term unemployed is a critical element, it is just one part of this
package of reforms, which also includes substantial federal tax cuts, along with
changes to the administrative infrastructure of federal employment agencies and a
program of incentives for people who choose to start their own businesses. Id.
150. The Hartz Commission, created by the German government, was
comprised of government-appointed labor market experts and led by Dr. Peter
Hartz, who was at the time the Director of Human Resources for the German
automobile manufacturer Volkswagen AG. See Agenda 2010 Questions and
Answers, supra note 64, at 20. Dr. Hartz resigned from Volkswagen AG on July 8,
2005 after being accused of wrongdoing in a corporate corruption and sexual
misconduct scandal. Luke Harding, Schr6der Adviser Resigns from VW in Sex
Scandal, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jul. 9, 2005),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,2763,1524805,00.html.
151. Agenda 2010 Questions and Answers, supra note 64, at 20.
The Hartz Commission came up with four separate laws: Hartz I
and II reformed certain regulatory aspects of the job market, Hartz I
and III changed the administrative structure of the country's federal
employment agencies, and Hartz IV introduced a new calculation
method for federal unemployment benefits paid to the long-term
unemployed.
Hartz I came into effect on January 1, 2003.52 It reformed the
job placement activities of government-run employment agencies,
requiring each to set up a separate Personnel Service Agencies
(Personal-Service-Agentur). 153 Each Personal Service Agency would
be responsible for "employ[ing] people who are out of work" and
placing them in temporary positions with outside companies.' 54
Under the law, the goal of Personal Service Agencies is not providing
companies with temporary workers, but providing temporary workers
with the opportunity to pursue permanent employment with the
companies in which they are placed ("vermittlungsorientierte
Leiharbeit," or "temporary work oriented toward job placement"). 155
The law further mandates that Personal Service Agency clients
("employees") be provided with vocational training opportunities if
temporary jobs with companies are not available.' 56
Hartz I also created a federal program that provided financial
support to unemployed people who establish their own small
businesses.' 57 The program provides non-taxable monthly subsidies
to each small business owner until his or her business achieves a
152. BRUNO KALTENBORN ET AL., HARTZ-EVALUIERUNG: AUSGANGSLAGE,
ERSTER ZWISCHENBERICHT [HARTZ-EVALUATION: INITIAL POSITION, FIRST
INTERIM REPORT] 12 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.bmas.bund.de/BMAS/Redaktion/Pdf/Publikationen/hartz-evaluierung-
ausgangslage,property=pdf,bereich=bmas,sprache=de,rwb-true.pdf. Kaltenborn
led a Berlin-based research team that was commissioned by Germany's Federal
Ministry for Economy and Employment (Bundesiminsterium flir Wirtschaft und
Arbeit) to conduct a study on the Hartz reforms and their effects. Id. at 1, 9-10.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Agenda 2010 Questions and Answers, supra note 64, at 12.
155. See id. See also Kaltenborn, supra note 152, at 29.
156. Agenda 2010 Questions and Answers, supra note 64, at 12.
157. Id. The program came to be known as the "Ich-AG" program, which
translates to "Me, Inc." in American English. See id.
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C25,000 annual profit.158  Many Germans took advantage of this
program-in September 2004 alone, 164,000 people created their
own companies. 159
Hartz II, which went into effect on April 1, 2003, expanded the
government's existing "Mini-Job" program ("Geringfiigige
Beschiftigung").160 Under the new law, for jobs paying €400 or less
per month,161 the employee is not required to pay taxes on his or her
wages, even if the mini-job represents a second job for someone who
is already working full-time elsewhere.' 62 This program provides
important benefits to employers to encourage creation of these jobs.
First, employers are only required to pay 25% of the employee's
wages into the federal social security system. 163 The job creation
process is also drastically simplified: employers have greater
flexibility in establishing working hours and can take advantage of a
"straightforward administrative reporting process" when registering
these jobs with the federal government. 16 4
Hartz III reformed the administrative infrastructure of the federal
agencies that provide social welfare and unemployment assistance
and benefits. On January 1, 2004, what been known as the Federal
Labor Office (Arbeitsamt) became the Federal Job Agency (Agentur
Jar Arbeit).165 According to the Hartz Commission's reasoning, this
oversized and ineffective agency needed to be overhauled because it
158. Id. Participants receive €600 a month for the first year running the
business, E360 for the second year, and £240 for the third year. Id. The federal
Employment Agency is responsible for paying out these grants. Id.
159. Kaltenborn, supra note 152, at 29.
160. Id. at 12. See also DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK [FEDERAL BANK OF
GERMANY], MONTHLY REPORT (Feb. 2005),
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/mba/2005/200502mba-en-ec
onomic.pdf [hereinafter Bundesbank February 2005 Report].
161. This represents an increase from the previous maximum allowable
amount, £325 per month. Bundesbank February 2005 Report, supra note 160, at
38.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Drittes Gesetz fir Modeme Dienstleistung am Arbeitsmarkt [Third Law
for Modem Service to the Labor Market] (Hartz III) Art. 1 § 5(a) (2003).
was at least partially responsible for Germany's labor market and
unemployment problems. 16
6
Under Hartz III, each local Job Agency' 67 includes both a social
services office and an unemployment office, the combination of
which in a single location is intended to streamline the bureaucratic
process involved in providing services1 68 to companies seeking to
hire workers and to the public at large. 169 Since social welfare and
unemployment offices had been separate in the past, combining them
to create a single agency presented unique problems. Each agency
type inherently focuses on different client needs and goals, which
affects how data is collected from clients, how it is electronically
stored and accessed, and how it is used by agency employees to
provide optimal assistance to clients. 70
166. See Europe: A Plan to Put Germans Back Into Jobs; Germany's Labour-
Market Reforms, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2002 at 33 [hereinafter The
Economist-Germans Back Into Jobs]. At the time the Hartz Commission
conducted its investigation, this agency employed at least 90,000 people and had a
budget of €54 million per year. Id. The agency was also providing greatly inflated
figures regarding its success in placing people in jobs. Where it claimed a 60%
placement rate, the Hartz Commission discovered it was really closer to 20%. The
Economist-Here are the Ideas, supra note 39, at 33.
167. A local Job Agency is also known as an "Agentur fJr Arbeit," or
colloquially in German as a "Jobcenter." See Sigrid Weise, Die Hartz-Reformen
III und IV-"F6rdern und Fordern, " DIE ZEIT ONLINE DOSSIER (Oct. 23, 2003),
http://www.zeit.de/2003/44/Hartz Kasten?page=all.
168. Id. Under the pre-Hartz III system, those offices were in separate
locations and did not readily communicate with each other, creating a complicated
bureaucratic process for those unemployed people who sought benefits. See id.
169. BBMFI Manual, supra note 40, at 113. Each job center is responsible for
placing employees in employment and apprenticeship positions as well as
providing practical advice and job training. Id. Anyone is eligible to utilize the
services of a government job center, regardless of whether he or she has made
payments into the federal social security system. Id.
170. See Hartz and Minds, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005 at 26. Merging these
two agencies caused a kind of culture clash. While social welfare agencies focus
on paying benefits, unemployment agencies focus on helping clients find work. Id.
It causes further problems when so many clients with so many different needs are
placed together into one system and the agency is forced to follow regulations that
focus on getting as many of them working as possible. See id. Clients had to fill
out lengthy questionnaires, the data from which the agencies needed to determine
which types of benefits those clients were eligible for under the new system. Id.
Accordingly, a new computer system had to be created that could handle such a
large amount of data, the implementation of which was problematic and included
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However, proponents of Hartz III focused not on the challenge of
creating the combined-agency system, but on the system's post-
combination benefits. Operating under its new key concept, "Job
Placement Instead of Administration" ("Vermitteln statt
Verwalten ,),171 the main goal of the newly-combined agencies is to
provide much more efficient service to unemployed clients, including
shorter waiting times, faster response to basic client requests,
expansion of the services available over the telephone, and fewer
cases per case manager. 172 This new system allows case managers to
have increased contact with their unemployed clients, allowing them
to more easily determine their clients' skills, strengths, and
weaknesses. This better allows case managers to facilitate more
effective job placement for both job seekers and the employers
themselves. 1
73
Hartz III was a necessary preparatory precursor to Hartz IV,
which went into effect on January 1, 2005. Hartz IV established a
new benefit payment system for those people who it considers to be
the long-term unemployed-people who are (1) between the ages of
fifteen and sixty-five, (2) capable of being employed, (3) in need of
assistance, and (4) living in Germany. 174
numerous system crashes because there was no time to test it properly and because
the central server could not handle the high volume of data entry and access. See
id.
171. BUNDESM1NISTERIUM FOR WIRTSCHAFT UND ARBEIT [FEDERAL MINISTRY
FOR ECONOMICS AND EMPLOYMENT], HARTZ IV-MENSCHEN IN ARBEIT BRINGEN
[HARTZ IV--GETTING PEOPLE WORKING] 30 (June 2005) [hereinafter BMWA-
Hartz IV].
172. Marc Beise, Hartz Lexicon-Hartz Ill, SODDEUTSCHEZEITUNG ONLINE
(Aug. 14, 2004),
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/jobkarriere/erfolggeld/schwerpunkt/495/37458/ 1/inde
x.html/wirtschaft/artikelU177/37140/article.html. See also Weise, supra note 167;
BMWA-Hartz IV, supra note 171, at 33-34. Hartz III reduced the number of
cases each case manager is responsible for from up to 800 to only seventy-five. Id.
It also provided financial incentives for case managers who were effective in
helping people find jobs. The Economist--Germans Back Into Jobs, supra note
166, at 33.
173. See also BMWA-Hartz IV, supra note 171, at 33-34.
174. Sozialgesetzbuch [SGB] Zweites Buch [II] - Grundsicherung fiir
Arbeitsuchende [Social Insurance Code II - Unemployment Insurance] Dec. 24,
2003, § 7, 1. "Capable of being employed" ("erwerbsfdhig") means that the
person is not unable to work for the foreseeable future because of illness or
Under the Hartz IV regulations, during the initial period of
unemployment, the person receives unemployment insurance
payments (Arbeitslosengeld 1), which are similar to unemployment
insurance payments known as Arbeitslosengeld under the previous
system.'75 However, after this period has passed, those who are still
without work instead receive a single monthly paynent, known as
"Unemployment Money II" (Arbeitslosengeld I), rather than any
combination of benefits available under the old system.' 76
Hartz IV does not eliminate social welfare benefits
(Sozialhilfe)-it only limits their availability to people who cannot
hold a job due to age or disability and makes them unavailable to the
long-term unemployed.
The monthly benefit paid to Arbeitslosengeld II recipients is the
same fixed monthly amount that Sozialhilfe recipients receive:
Germans who live in the former West Germany receive €345 per
month, while those in the former East Germany receive €331 per
month. 77 In addition, recipients are also legally entitled to receive
enough money to cover "reasonable" ("angemessen") heating costs
and rent. 178
Since the main principle of Hartz IV is "sanction and support"
("Fordern und Firdern"),179 Hartz IV includes strict regulations that
disability, and can generally work for at least three hours per day. Id. § 8 1. "In
need of assistance" ("hilfebediirftig") describes people who, by their own means
alone, cannot sufficiently support themselves and their dependents, and who cannot
receive financial assistance from other sources. Id. § 9 1.
175. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. To qualify for
Arbeitslosengeld I after the Hartz IV reforms, the unemployed person must have
been working for at least twelve months during the three years prior to the loss of
employment, and must have made contributions into the federal social security
system. BBMFI Manual, supra note 40, at 123, 129. Failing to register with the
local employment agency (Agentur fir Arbeit) after becoming unemployed may
cause a forfeiture of benefits. Id.
176. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
177. Sozialgesetzbuch [SGB] Zweites Buch [II] - Grundsicherung fir
Arbeitsuchende [Social Insurance Code II - Unemployment Insurance] Dec. 24,
2003, § 20, 2.
178. Id. § 22, 1.
179. See BMWA-Hartz IV, supra note 171, at 26. "Sanction and support" is
a very important concept of the Hartz reforms because it meets two main goals-
making sure that unemployed people have not only more opportunities, but also
more responsibility. Id.
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reduce the level of benefits Arbeitslosengeld II recipients are eligible
to receive if they do not accept the support they are offered. For
example, if a recipient of Arbeitslosengeld II refuses to accept a
"reasonable" (zumutbar) employment position (including a mini-
job 80 ), then the person's benefits are reduced by 30%.181
Hartz IV is Also intended to foster a shift from reliance on the
state to reliance on one's personal support network. Accordingly, the
income of the recipient's spouse is considered in determining the
amount of Arbeitslosengeld II benefits for which the unemployed
person qualifies.' 82
Reaction to the Hartz reforms, and in particular to the creation of
the Arbeitslosengeld II payments scheme, has been widely
negative. 183 Many Germans took pride in the fact that their social
welfare system provided such generous benefits to those people who
were unlucky enough to find themselves unemployed,'84 and have
found it difficult to see those benefits reduced so drastically, knowing
that so many people would struggle just to get by. 85 Particularly in
180. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
181. Sozialgesetzbuch [SGB] Zweites Buch [II] - Grundsicherung ftir
Arbeitsuchende [Social Insurance Code II - Unemployment Insurance] Dec. 24,
2003, § 31, 1. See also Weise, supra note 167.
182. Weise, supra note 167.
183. See generally Tim Weber, German Unemployment Weighs on Voters,
BBC NEWS ONLINE , Sept. 16, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4248034.stm.
184. Studies have shown that Europeans generally believe that people are poor
because they are unfortunate victims of society-wide problems, and are therefore
deserving of social assistance. See Alberto Alesina et al., Why Doesn't The U.S.
Have A European-Style Welfare State? 34 (Harvard Institute for Economic
Research, Discussion Paper No. 1933, Nov. 2001), available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2001papers/HIER1933.pdf.
185. Social Science students at Humboldt University in Berlin conducted an
experiment to see what it was like to live on just E345 per month, the
Arbeitslosengeld II benefit paid to the long term unemployed under Hartz IV. See
Nicola Holzapfel, Die Hartz-IV-Simulanten [The Hartz IV Simulators],
SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2005),
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/jkl4/jobkarriereiberufstudium/artikel/901/65836/.
The students found that they had little, if any, money left at the end of the month.
Id. They had difficulties covering the cost of public transportation, and found that
they did not have enough money to buy winter clothes or to join their friends for
social outings. Id. By the end of the experiment, the students had a keen
East Germany, where under Communism the government ensured
that everyone had a job, dismay over the reduced benefits is
combined with anger that the government is not doing more to ensure
that there are enough jobs available for everyone to earn a living. 186
Economists have also taken a dim view of the reforms. A
number of Germany's leading economic think tanks collaborated to
conduct a study on the Hartz reforms, producing a report that totaled
over 1,000 pages. 187 The study did find that certain elements of the
Hartz reforms were successful, such as the "Ich-AG" small business
subsidy program, 188 which was seen as a positive way to help people
avoid returning to the welfare rolls.' 89 The expansion of the mini-job
program 9 ° was given mixed marks in the report. While it boosted
job creation, significant doubts were raised as to whether the program
was meeting its goal of integrating the unemployed into the regular
workforce, since it appeared that mini-jobs rarely become
permanent. 191  Other aspects of the reforms failed to meet
expectations altogether, such as the Personal Service Agencies,' 92
which were found to add, on average, an additional month to the
duration of one's unemployment status.193
The Hartz reforms had a critical impact on the September 2005
Parliamentary elections in Germany. Chancellor Schr6der's Social
Democrat Party (SPD) lost their Parliamentary majority, forcing
understanding of just how much an Arbeitslosengeld II recipient had to struggle
just to make ends meet every month. See id.
186. See It's Those People, All Over Again, THE ECONOMIST 29, Aug. 14,
2004. This dissatisfaction manifested itself in numerous public protests against the
Hartz reforms that took place throughout eastern Germany during the summer of
2004. See id. See also Hardy Graupner, East Germans Vent Anger at Social Cuts,
DEUTSCHE WELLE NEWS SERVICE (August 10, 2004), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,, 1294031,00.html.
187. Olaf Storbeck & Klaus Stratmann, Die Hartz-Reformen Verpuffen [The
Hartz Reforms Fall Flat], HANDELSBALTT ONLINE (Dec. 27, 2005),
http://www.handelsblatt.com/pshb?fn=tt&sfn=go&id= 1161953.
188. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
189. Storbeck & Stratmann, supra note 187.
190. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
191. Storbeck & Stratmann, supra note 187.
192. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
193. Storbeck & Stratmann, supra note 187.
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Chancellor Schrbder out of office. 194 He was replaced by Angela
Merkel, a member of the "center-right" Christian Democratic Union
(CDU), who leads a parliamentary "Grand Coalition" between the
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats.1
95
It is not clear what the future holds for these reforms now that
their chief champion, Schr6der, is no longer in charge of the federal
government. What is clear, however, is that Chancellor Merkel has
inherited two large problems: not only mass unemployment itself, but
also everyday Germans' general dissatisfaction with the
government's efforts in dealing with it. 1
96
194. When Schr6der was elected German chancellor in 1998, he told the
electorate that if a Schr6der-led government could not reduce the number of
unemployed Germans to below 3.5 million, then the German people had no
business re-electing it. Exit Schr6der, Enter Merkel?, THE ECONOMIST, May 26,
2005. Unfortunately, he did not introduce the first of the Hartz labor market
reforms until 2003, and by the time the election was held in 2005 there were still
around five million unemployed in Germany. Id. German voters apparently took
him at his word, handing a defeat (albeit an extremely narrow one) to Schr6der's
Social Democrat party in the 2005 Parliamentary elections, giving a very slight
Parliamentary majority to the opposition Christian Democrats. See German
Politics-A Difficult Pairing, an Uncertain Outcome, THE ECONOMIST 51, Oct. 15,
2005.
195. German Politics-One Last Shot, THE ECONOMIST 53, Nov. 17 2005.
This coalition represents "the first left-right alliance in 36 years." Id. Chancellor
Merkel has high hopes for this coalition, seeing it as a "full marriage" ("erftillte
Eheleben") that, in her view, will be able to work together to successfully reform
health insurance, the tax code, and the labor market. Lorenz Wolf-Doettinchem,
Der Aufschwung Kommt [The Upswing is Coming], STERN, Mar. 30, 2006, at 42.
196. Despite these problems, Germans seem willing to give Chancellor Merkel
a fair chance uring her first few months in office, Chancellor Merkel earned
high approval ratings from the German public (although during that time she dealt
primarily with international affairs issues). Andrew Purvis, Land of Smiles, TIME
(INTERNATIONAL EDITION), Apr. 10, 2006, at 28. Her style of governing, in
contrast with that of her predecessor, has won her points among the German public.
She is viewed as an analytical leader who shuns the spotlight and insists on open
channels of communication with her staff members and fellow politicians. Id. at
30. It is clear that she will need the approval that she has earned from her fellow
citizens, as she soon will have to deal with the more difficult (and urgent) issues
facing the country, such as implementing health care and labor reforms. See id. at
28, 30.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIs-PRWORA v. AGENDA 2010
Although Germany and the United States had completely
different reasons for reforming their social welfare systems
(Germany's was based more on economics,19 7 whereas in the United
States it was in response to social and political issues 98), in the end
they shared a common goal: both countries wanted to get as many
people who could work as possible into the workforce and off public
assistance, and both countries sought to do so by reducing the amount
of social welfare benefits to which those people are entitled. In both
Germany and the United States, social welfare reform was used as a
means to fix significant problems related to failed social and
economic policies, thereby placing the brunt of the burden of
repairing these failures on society's neediest citizens.
Any society-wide success related to reforms such as these would
undoubtedly come with a price: a permanent poverty class comprised
of those who could not adjust to the changes. 199 While the existence
of such a class might be more acceptable in the United States than in
Germany, 200 the fact remains that, in such a system, there will
probably always be have-nots.
197. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
198. See Part III-A.
199. See Leisering & Leibfried, supra note 31, at 34. Limiting the amount of
benefits that can be received or the length of time a person is eligible to receive
them creates a fear of poverty that may encourage someone to get it together and
find a job. See id. However, the consequence of poverty is always real, making
poverty a useful element of the system or a "normali[z]ed social condition." Id. at
34, 48.
200. The whole idea of a permanent poverty class may be more acceptable in
the United States than in Germany because it has been shown that attitudes toward
the poor differ between the United States and Europe. See Alesina, supra note 184,
at 34-38. While Europeans generally believe that the poor are unlucky, Americans
in general feel that anyone can work their way out of poverty and those who have
not done so are lazy. Id. at 34. It is believed that the American sentiment is
influenced by factors such as the importance of hard work in American society.
See id. at 34. Racism may also play a role: in certain segments of society, the idea
that racial minorities are taking disproportionate advantage of social welfare
benefits has led to a favorable view of reducing social welfare programs. See id. at
39.
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Both countries had sustained social welfare systems for decades,
expanding and adapting them with the changing times,20 1 and both
countries obviously put a lot of work and thought into their
respective reforms. However, it seems clear that, in both Germany
and the United States, government leaders were looking at social
welfare reforms as a mechanism to quickly fix other types of
problems that had been evolving over many years, and that they did
not necessarily come up with a holistic solution that went far enough
toward eliminating those problems at their roots. Specifically, it
seems that both countries missed a golden opportunity to reduce the
potential that its citizens would wind up jobless and impoverished,
because neither set of reforms included significant changes to the
current education system.2 °2 The money saved by cutting social
welfare benefits is certainly well-spent if it provides more effective
employment services. However, people who depend on social
welfare benefits to survive are often those who lack sufficient
education to find a decent job. Had some of that money been used to
improve schools and services for young people, it would have gone a
long way toward ensuring that future generations would see fewer
people relying on public assistance, out of work, and living in
poverty.
Germany can certainly benefit from examining the experience in
the United States. It has been shown that people who are used to
living on government benefits have a hard time adjusting to life as a
working person, and that they will need continuous support.20 3 It is
201. See Parts II-A and II-B.
202. While the lack of equal educational opportunities exist in both countries,
this problem is more pronounced in Germany. Germany's education system
features a three-tract system, in which it is determined at a young age what type of
high school the student will attend-a university-prep high school (a Gymnasium,
from which a student receives an Abitur certificate), a high school that offers
training for skilled laborers (Realschule), or a high school that only offers a basic
completion certificate (Hauptschule). See Ardaugh, supra note 29, at 237. There
is significant social divisiveness within this system, which has more recently
manifested itself in the fact that many children of immigrants end up in the lowest-
level Hauptschule, which is seen to lead to nothing but a bleak future of poverty
and joblessness. Katrin Benhold, In Germany, Immigrants Face a Tough Road,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE ONLINE (Dec. 25, 2005),
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/25/news/islam8.php. In fact one Turkish
Hauptschule student summed up his future in two words: "Hartz IV." Id.
203. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
encouraging that one of the main goals in the Hartz III reforms was
to reduce the number of cases per caseworker in the unemployment
offices, and that caseworkers receive financial incentives for helping
people find work.2 °4 However, there should also be some type of
system that rewards the hard work involved in helping clients keep
their jobs, which experienced caseworkers in the United States
consider to be an exceedingly difficult task.20 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, it cannot be a bad thing to pursue a goal of moving
people off public assistance and into the workforce. However, if
there are no jobs to move them into, or if the jobs don't pay enough
to raise them out of poverty, welfare-to-work reforms might do more
harm than good to society's most vulnerable citizens.
In reforming social welfare programs, it is important for the
government to be mindful of the reason those programs are there in
the first place: to provide assistance to some for the benefit of society
as a whole.
204. See supra note 171.
205. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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